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European Central Bank working paper series 66Abstract
This paper surveys intergenerational altruism in neoclassical growth models. It
¯rst examines Barro's approach to intergenerational altruism, whereby successive
generations are linked by recursive altruistic preferences. Individuals have an al-
truistic concern only for their children, who in turn also have altruistic feelings for
their own children. The conditions under which the Ricardian equivalence (debt
neutrality) theorem applies are speci¯ed. The e®ectiveness of ¯scal policy is further
analysed in the context of an economy populated by heterogeneous families di®ering
with respect to their degree of intergenerational altruism. Other forms of altruism,
referred to as ad hoc altruism, are also examined, along with their implications for
¯scal policy.
JEL classi¯cation numbers: E 13, D 64, E 62, C 60.
Keywords: Neoclassical general aggregative models, Altruism, Fiscal Policy.
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August 2004Non-technical summary
Private sector's reaction to ¯scal policy is a key determinant to the e®ectiveness
of ¯scal policy in stimulating economic activity and growth. Modern macroeconomic
theory is based on the assumption of highly rational and reactive agents, who are
farsighted and rely on rather complex calculations to take their consumption-saving
decisions. There are two main paradigms in modern macroeconomics: the overlap-
ping generations model and the in¯nitely lived agent models. In the former public
debt crowds out private saving and has real e®ects on economic activity, whereas
in the latter it is neutral. It has been shown that the debt neutrality result { often
referred to as the Ricardian equivalence theorem { depends on the set of taxpayers
and is valid only if the set of taxpayers remain the same over time, which is the case
in the in¯nitely lived agent model. In this respect, death seems to make the Ri-
cardian equivalence theorem a theoretical curiosity, and the overlapping generations
model a more realistic abstraction of real economies.
While it is true that individual die, human organisations, among them families,
are more permanent and may even be in¯nitely lived, thereby giving some support
to the debt neutrality result. Intergenerational altruism reconciles ¯nite lifetime and
in¯nite horizons. Family a®ections clearly extend one's economic decision making
beyond one's ¯nite lifetime, triggering intergenerational transfers such as education
or bequests. Families may then well be able to counter the e®ects of ¯scal policy,
exactly as in¯nitely lived agents are in standard macroeconomic models. This paper
is a self-contained survey examining intergenerational altruism in neoclassical growth
models, its e®ects on the economic equilibrium and on the e®ectiveness of ¯scal
policy.
In 1974 Barro revived Ricardo's idea of the o®setting of public by private trans-
fers, leading to the neutrality of public debt. Barro's analysis of debt neutrality
is based on an assumption that individuals are motivated by a special form of in-
tergenerational altruism (dynastic altruism), whereby individuals have an altruistic
concern for their children, who in turn also have altruistic feelings for their own
children, and so on. Through such a recursive relation all generations of a single
family (a dynasty) are linked together by a chain of private intergenerational trans-
fers, countervailing any attempt by the government to redistribute resources across
generations. This o®setting of public by private transfers operates only if bequests
are positive. This is an important quali¯cation to Barro's debt neutrality result.
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August 2004Dynastic altruism, which is the more prominent and conceptually consistent
form of altruism developed in dynamic models, is thoroughly reviewed. In models
of parent-to-child or descending dynastic altruism, Ricardian equivalence obtains
only if bequests are positive. Otherwise, families { albeit altruistic { behave as if
they consisted of sel¯sh agents, leaving room for e®ective ¯scal policy. The non-
negative bequest condition plays a crucial role in the determination of the economic
equilibrium and the validity of the debt neutrality result. While resembling a liq-
uidity constraint in the in¯nitely lived agent model, it forbids parents to borrow
using their children's future earnings or human capital as collateral. This is con-
sistent with the fact that inherited debts are not enforceable. After characterising
the economic equilibria with positive and zero bequests, we analyse the role of ¯scal
policy in the dynastic model, and mainly expound the debt neutrality result, along
with the neutrality of pay-as-you-go social security under lump-sum transfers. Any
dynamic path of the economy with dynastic altruists coincides with the social opti-
mum (assuming that the social discount rate equals the intergenerational discount
rate in families): any lump-sum redistribution of resources across generations is neu-
tral, provided that bequests are positive all along the equilibrium path. We further
analyse ¯scal policy by departing from the standard assumption that individuals
are homogenous and characterised by the same degree of intergenerational altruism.
When individuals are heterogenous with respect to their degree of altruism, public
debt does not a®ect the long-term economic equilibrium, which is pinned down by
the degree of altruism of the more altruistic family. Public debt however operates
a redistribution of resources away from the less altruistic families who face binding
bequest constraints in the long run.
We also examine other forms of dynastic altruism consistent with Barro's recur-
sive de¯nition of altruism, ascending altruism and two-sided altruism. These forms
could be expected to deliver debt neutrality unconditionally, as families leaving zero
bequests could be families characterised by child-to-parent gift under ascending al-
truism. We ¯nd that this is not the case and no form of dynastic altruism therefore
ensures debt neutrality without condition. Even under two-sided altruism there are
cases, in which both bequests and gifts are constrained and ¯scal policy remains ef-
fective. We then review ad hoc forms of altruism and their implications for the debt
6
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August 2004neutrality results. Only one speci¯c form of ad hoc altruism always guarantees debt
neutrality; this form departs from the recursive approach underpinning dynastic al-
truism, with its objective function being formally equivalent to that of the social
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How do altruistic sentiments in the family a®ect economic outcomes and policies?
This largely self-contained paper surveys the macroeconomic literature on inter-
generational altruism, examining the assumptions underpinning altruistic growth
models and their consequences for both the macroeconomic equilibrium and ¯scal
policy.
Private sector's reaction to ¯scal policy is a key determinant to the e®ectiveness
of ¯scal policy in stimulating economic activity and growth. Modern macroeco-
nomic theory is based on the assumption of highly rational and reactive economic
agents, who are farsighted and rely on rather complex calculations to take their
consumption-saving decisions. However, the two main macroeconomic paradigms -
the overlapping generations model and the in¯nitely lived agent model - entail oppo-
site conclusions regarding the impact of ¯scal policy on economic activity. Whereas
public debt crowds out private savings and results in a lower level of capital ac-
cumulation in the Allais (1947) - Samuelson (1958) - Diamond (1965) overlapping
generations model, it is neutral in the Ramsey (1928) in¯nitely lived agent model.
Key to the neutrality result is the overlap between the period of time over which
the government reimburses public debt by levying taxes and the period of time over
which the consumer's budget constraint extends. If consumers die before public debt
is redeemed, the ¯nancing of a given level of public expenditure from the issuance
of public bonds increases their net wealth compared with an equivalent ¯nancing
from taxation, as death allows them to escape future taxation and to leave the tax
burden to future generations. More generally, Buiter (1988) and Weil (1989) proved
that the cornerstone of the neutrality result is whether or not new agents enter the
economy. In¯nitely lived individuals would not support the entire tax burden as-
sociated with increases in public debt, were new individuals to be born tomorrow,
regardless of their life span. The set of taxpayers must remain the same over time
for the neutrality result to apply.
Intergenerational altruism reconciles ¯nite lifetimes and in¯nite horizons. Family
a®ections extend one's economic decision making beyond one's ¯nite lifetime. The
view that wealth is stored up for the purposes of enhancing children's welfare has
been advocated by neoclassical economists. In his Principles of Political Economy,
Marshall points to the concern for children as the main reason for saving. This
8
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truistic families or dynasties, exactly as in¯nitely lived agents, are able to counter
the e®ects of ¯scal policy. If a government takes one euro from children and gives
it to their parents, it a®ects neither parents' nor children's consumption pro¯les,
since the parents compensate for this transfer by increasing their bequests to their
beloved children by exactly one euro. This o®setting of public by private transfers is
at the heart of the debt neutrality debate, which dates back to Ricardo and has been
revived by Barro (1974). Barro's approach to intergenerational transfers is in line
with Becker's (1974) theory of social interactions, according to which redistribution
between family members is neutral, when the head of the family makes positive
gifts to all the members of the family. Barro applies the same logic to the complete
sequence of descendants.
Barro's analysis of debt neutrality is based on an assumption that individuals
are motivated by a special form of intergenerational altruism, which we refer to as
dynastic altruism. Individuals have an altruistic concern for their children, who also
have altruistic feelings for their own children, and so on. Through this recursive
relation, all generations of a single family - or a dynasty - are linked together by
a chain of private intergenerational transfers. This view of altruism is consistent
with the succession of generations within a dynasty and therefore fully reconciles
¯nite life and in¯nite horizon. In this respect, dynastic altruism seems to provide a
fully °edged microeconomic foundation for the in¯nitely lived agent model, insofar
as the in¯nitely lived agent can be interpreted as a dynasty of altruistically linked
individuals. A dynasty, however, clearly di®ers from an in¯nitely lived agent, insofar
as it is a succession of distinct - albeit altruistic - individuals, who are endowed with
their own preferences and freedom of choice. This entails serious quali¯cations to the
debt neutrality result - also known as the Ricardian equivalence theorem. Assume
for instance that parents are so poor that despite their strong altruistic feelings they
cannot a®ord to leave bequests to their children. If the government takes one euro
away from these now relatively wealthy children and gives it to their needy parents,
the parents would use this sum to increase their consumption, not to increase their
bequests, and the children would end up with a lifetime income lower than prior
to the policy intervention. Importantly, this suggests that parents fully agree with
this redistributive scheme and would even implement it themselves in the family by
leaving debt - negative bequests - to their children, if inherited debt were enforceable.
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economic equilibrium and in the analysis of ¯scal policy in the dynastic model. Even
though it formally resembles a liquidity constraint in the in¯nitely lived agent model,
there is a clear distinction between non-negative bequest conditions and liquidity
constraints. While there is no reason for forbidding individuals to borrow over their
life-cycle, using future earnings as collateral, children's future labour income - or
human capital - is no valid collateral for parents' private borrowing. Altruistic
feelings do not always trigger positive transfers between generations. Poor parents
love their children but may leave no bequests, which has direct implications for the
e®ectiveness of ¯scal policy. Fiscal policy is e®ective, when successive generations
are not linked by a chain of positive private transfers.
Modelling the bequest motive requires several crucial assumptions in a dynastic
framework, as described by Barro (1974). When presenting the altruistic individ-
ual's utility function in Section 2, we pay particular attention to the modelling of
expectations and to the ¯rst individual of the altruistic dynasty, two aspects which
are usually disregarded in the literature. The behaviour of altruists is illustrated
in the case of a small open economy. In Section 3 we examine the closed econ-
omy version of altruistic models and characterise the intertemporal equilibrium,
which generically features either zero bequests (bequest-constrained equilibrium) or
positive bequests (bequest-unconstrained equilibrium). We also compare the in-
tertemporal equilibrium with the social optimum. In Section 4 we characterise the
steady state equilibria of the dynastic model, focusing on existence and multiplicity.
The neutrality of ¯scal policy - public debt, social security and estate taxation - is
thoroughly analysed in Section 5, where we provide a theoretical exposition of the
Ricardian equivalence theorem.
The baseline altruistic model of economic growth presented in Sections 2 to 5
is built upon the assumption of a representative family or dynasty, in this respect
very much similar to the in¯nitely lived representative agent model. The coexistence
of bequest-constrained and bequest-unconstrained families is worth enquiring and
seems to be a more appropriate abstraction of real economies, where heterogeneity
of behaviours clearly prevails. In Section 6 we consider the altruistic growth models
with heterogeneous individuals. It is shown that Ricardian equivalence still holds
from a macroeconomic viewpoint, as capital accumulation, which is driven by the
10
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but that there are important distributional e®ects of ¯scal policies.
Other forms of altruism, which have been investigated in the literature, are also
reviewed in Section 7. First, we review models of ascending altruism and models of
two-sided altruism, which stretch Barro's intuitive formulation of dynastic or pure
altruism towards its limit. Second, we survey other forms of altruism, which we
refer to as ad hoc altruism. They are ad hoc to the extent that the benefactor's
utility does not directly depends on the bene¯ciary's utility, in contrast to Barro's
description of family a®ections. Extensions of the baseline altruistic growth model
to the ¯elds of education and of environmental economics are provided in Section 8.
A last section o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 The behaviour of altruistic households
The overlapping generations model is appropriate for the analysis of intergenera-
tional transfers, owing to its demographic structure. Altruistic transfers are there-
fore investigated in a dynastic framework underpinned by the baseline two-period
overlapping generations model, in which a new generation is born in each period, so
that two generations are alive in each period. First, we brie°y outline the two-period
overlapping generations model, a thorough exposition of which is provided by de la
Croix and Michel (2002). Second, we introduce the bequest motive in this model,
setting out the utility function of altruistic individuals. Third, we characterise the
optimal decisions taken by altruistic individuals. Finally, we consider the small open
economy case with a view to illustrating the behaviour of altruists.
2.1 The two-period overlapping generations model
Consider an economy where time is discrete. Individuals who are identical within as
well as across generations are indexed by their date of birth, t. An individual's life-
cycle consists of two periods, which we refer to as youth and old-age. The number
of individuals born in period t is Nt = (1 + n)Nt¡1, where n > ¡1 is the exogenous
population growth rate.
Young agents born in period t supply one unit of labour, receive the market wage
wt, consume ct and save st, therefore facing the budget constraint: wt = ct + st.
11
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the factor of interest.
Agents are sel¯sh and maximise their life-cycle utility1 Ut = U(ct;dt+1). Their
saving function sD is given by:
st = argmax
s U(wt ¡ s;Rt+1s) ´ s
D(wt;Rt+1)
Their optimal consumptions are:






With a neoclassical production sector, the equilibrium of the overlapping genera-
tions economy may be dynamically ine±cient. Saving decisions are decentralised and
individuals may save more than necessary to maintain the golden rule capital stock,
de¯ned as the stock of capital maximising net output. In such a case, the economic
equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. There is then room for ¯scal policies such as
public debt ¯nancing or pay-as-you-go social security, which improve welfare by ab-
sorbing saving in excess of the golden rule, thereby increasing net output. Regarding
the long-run equilibria of the overlapping generations model, standard assumptions
on the utility and production function are not su±cient to ensure uniqueness or
even existence of positive steady states. Galor and Ryder (1989) have shown that,
under fairly standard assumptions, this model can experience no or more than one
positive steady state.
2.2 Modelling the bequest motive
Young altruists born in period t supply one unit of labour, receive the market wage
wt, inherit xt, consume ct and save st. When old, they consume part of the proceeds
of their savings, dt+1, and bequeath the remainder, (1+n)xt+1, to their 1+n children.
The budget constraints that individuals face over their life are therefore:
xt + wt = ct + st (1)
1We assume that the function U(c;d) is strictly concave and twice continuously di®erentiable





c(c;d) > 0, U0
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Bequests2 are private intergenerational transfers from the old to the young. Since
children are exempted by law from responsibility for parental debts, credit insti-
tutions do not accept children's future earnings as collateral for parents' private
borrowing. Inherited debt are not enforceable. In bequest models, it is therefore
assumed that parents face the following non-negativity constraint:
xt+1 ¸ 0 (3)
If this constraint is binding, bequests are zero and bequest motive said to be
inoperative. Altruistic households behave as if they were sel¯sh, when the non-
negative bequest constraint is binding. The evolution of bequests is obtained by




[Rt+1(xt + wt ¡ ct) ¡ dt+1] (4)
Parents are assumed to have an altruistic concern for their children. According
to Barro's (1974) recursive de¯nition of altruism3, parents care about their children's
welfare by weighting their children's utility in their own utility function Vt. Denoting
with Vt+1 the well-being of each of their 1 + n children, the utility of individuals
born in period t is given by:
Vt = Ut + °Vt+1 (5)
where Ut = U(ct;dt+1) is the utility from life-cycle consumption.
Parents have two sources of utility: (i) they derive (sel¯sh) utility from con-
sumption; (ii) they derive (altruistic) utility from the welfare of their children. We
refer to the parameter ° as the degree of intergenerational altruism4. Equation
2The structure of the model is such that parents' and children's life-cycles overlap. It results that
bequests could also be interpreted as inter vivos gifts. In the absence of incentive and information
problems, there is no di®erence between both types of transfers and we shall only refer to them as
bequests.
3Most authors, including Bevan and Stiglitz (1979), Buiter (1979) and Carmichael (1982),
who examine Barro`s formulation of dynastic altruism, assume separability with respect to the
attainable level of children's utility.
4An alternative speci¯cation consists in writing ~ °(1+n), where ~ ° is the factor of pure altruism
and 1 + n the number of children. These two formulations are equivalent, when the number of
children per family is exogenous (Buiter and Carmichael, 1984). A re¯nement of this approach
considers that altruism in°uences fertility (Barro and Becker, 1988).
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parents have altruistic feelings only for their own children, these children are also
concerned for their own children, i.e. Vt+1 = Ut+1 + °Vt+2. It results that parents'
utilities depend - albeit not directly - on the utilities of their grand-children, i.e.




















Altruistic individuals take into account the in¯nite stream of their descendants'
utilities. Their altruistic utility is equal to the discounted sum (with a discounting
factor °) of their own life-cycle utility and the life-cycle utilities of all their descen-
dants. The degree of intergenerational altruism ° is assumed to be smaller that 1.
This re°ects weights diminishing with the social distance between the altruists and
those to whom they are altruistically related, as parents discounts less the utility of
their children than that of their grand-children. This also implies that the in¯nite
sum (6) is convergent, when life-cycle utilities are bounded.
2.3 Expectations and optimal choices
Individuals belonging to generation µ ¸ t choose cµ, sµ, dµ+1 and xµ+1, take prices
wµ, Rµ+1 as given and maximise their utility Vµ subject to their budget constraints
(1) and (2) and to the non-negative bequest condition (3) evaluated in period t = µ.
To decide how much to leave to their children, they need to forecast the choices of
all their descendants, whose decisions and utility levels hinge on the bequests they
will receive. Individual choices are therefore based on forecasts of all current and
future prices.
In each period t, an individual's information set is denoted with Pt = f(wµ;Rµ+1);
µ ¸ tg. This notation makes clear that the expectations of all successive cohorts
14
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 386
August 2004are compatible, since we have Pt = Pt+1 [ (wt;Rt+1). By de¯nition the maximum
utility of an individual is given by the following recursive relation:
V
?








subject to (3) and (4).
V ?
t (xt;Pt) stands for the maximum level of utility that can be attained by indi-
viduals who have inherited xt from their parents. Importantly, this level depends
on the sequence of all current and future prices, fwµ;Rµ+1g
+1
µ=t, which is the individ-
ual's information set. This is the level of utility individuals attain by maximising
the sum of the utility they derive from their life-cycle consumption and the utility,
°V ?
t+1, they derive (out of altruism) from leaving a bequest xt+1 to each of their
1+n children. Equation (7) is a recursive relation, the solution of which fV ?
t (:)gt¸0
is the sequence of utilities of all members of the altruistic dynasty. This is also
the Bellman equation of an in¯nite horizon problem, relating the value function of
parents, V ?
t , to the value function of children, V ?
t+1. Two remarks are here in or-
der. First, the value function is generally not independent from the period where it
is evaluated, and is therefore indexed by time. Second, recursive utilities are well
de¯ned only if the expectations of all generations are compatible. Compatibility of
the expectations of successive generations is a crucial assumption of the altruistic
model, which is usually not stated in an explicit manner.
2.3.1 The associated in¯nite horizon optimisation problem
Consider the following in¯nite horizon problem with an initial state x0 ¸ 0 and an








subject to: 8t ¸ 0; xt+1 =
1
1 + n
[Rt+1(wt + xt ¡ ct) ¡ dt+1]
8t ¸ 1; xt ¸ 0
To characterise the solution of this maximisation problem5, we set up the La-
grangean Lt of period t, which is equal to the sum of the life-cycle utility U(ct;dt+1)
5For a thorough presentation of discrete time optimisation, see Mc Kenzie (1986).
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°pt+1xt+1 ¡ ptxt:
Lt = U(ct;dt+1) +
°
1 + n
pt+1[Rt+1(xt + wt ¡ ct) ¡ dt+1] ¡ ptxt


























pt+1Rt+1 · 0 (= 0 if x
?
t > 0) (11)
The transversality condition states that the limit of the shadow value of bequests





t = 0 (12)
These conditions, along with equations (3) and (4), are necessary and su±cient
conditions for optimality7. Equivalently, in addition to (3) and (4), the following





























t) · 0 (= 0 if x
?












t = 0 (15)
Equation (13) is obtained by merging equations (9) and (10) and eliminating
the shadow price pt+1. Equation (14) results from plugging (10) into (11). The
transversality condition (15) is also obtained by substitution of pt.
Equations (13) and (14) characterise the optimal life-cycle consumptions and
the optimal bequest x?
t. In period t, old individuals can reduce their own con-
sumption by one unit, su®ering a utility loss of U0
d(c?
t¡1;d?
t) and can increase their
6The current shadow price pt+1 of bequest xt+1 in period t+1 is discounted by the factor ° in
order to calculate the increase in the shadow value in period t.
7The necessary condition is satis¯ed when the objective is ¯nite along a path with zero bequests.
See assumption A.2. in Michel (1990a).
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t+1)=(1+n). If bequests are positive (x?
t > 0), the utility loss from
a reduction in parental consumption equals the utility gain from increased bequests.
If the utility loss from reduced consumption exceeds the utility gain from increased
bequests, altruists leave no bequests (x?
t = 0). Lastly, the transversality condition
(15) means that the limit of the shadow value of bequests is equal to zero.
If the optimisation problem (8) has an optimal solution from any date t onwards
and any level of xt, the associated sequence of value functions, Vt(x), which is by
de¯nition the maximum of the objective function (8) from t to +1 starting at
xt = x; satis¯es the Bellman equation8. Thus, this sequence of value functions9 is
the solution to the altruistic problem (7).
2.3.2 The dynasty's founding father
Despite the fact that the bequest left by the ¯rst old generation, x0, is usually
considered as given and treated as an initial condition of the economic dynamics,
it is actually an economic decision taken by the ¯rst old generation born in period
t = ¡1. The N¡1 ¯rst old agents receive the proceeds of their savings R0s¡1, which
they use to consume d0 and leave the remainder (1 + n)x0 to their children. In
period t = 0, the ¯rst-period consumption of the ¯rst old individual c¡1 is given,










subject to: R0s¡1 = d0 + (1 + n)x0 and x0 ¸ 0
Previously, we have resorted to the optimisation problem (8) to solve (7). Simi-





tU(ct;dt+1), is maximised under the following set of constraints (c¡1,
8The Bellman equation, which de¯nes the behaviour of altruistic individuals, corresponds to an
in¯nite number of optimisation problems.
9Standard assumptions ensure that these functions exist; see de la Croix and Michel (2002).
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8t ¸ 0 xt+1 =
1
1 + n
[Rt+1(wt + xt ¡ ct) ¡ dt+1]
8t ¸ 0 xt ¸ 0



















p1R1 · 0 (= 0 if x
?
0 > 0)
Note that the ¯rst condition corresponds to equation (10) evaluated in period
t = ¡1 and the second to equation (11) evaluated in period 0. Eliminating the
shadow prices in these two conditions, which characterise the optimal behaviour of
the ¯rst old altruists, gives equation (14) for t = 0.
2.4 Small open economy
It is more di±cult to characterise the behaviour of altruists than that of sel¯sh
individuals, as an altruist's economic decision making requires relatively sophisti-
cated expectations. In this section, altruistic behaviour is illustrated in the simple
case of a small open economy with a constant world interest rate or, alternatively,
of an economy where production occurs according to a linear technology. Such an
assumption simpli¯es the maximisation problem a great deal, since (given the wage
rate w and the interest factor R) the value function Vt(x) is independent from time:
V (xt) = max
ct;dt+1;xt+1
½
U(ct;dt+1) + °V (xt+1)
¾
subject to: xt+1 =
1
1 + n
[R(xt + w ¡ ct) ¡ dt+1] and xt+1 ¸ 0
18
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come as no surprise, since it is assumed that the dynasty's macroeconomic envi-
ronment is stationary. For any bequest x ¸ 0, the optimal consumptions ~ c = ~ c(x)
and ~ d = ~ d(x); and the bequest passed on to the next generation ~ z = ~ z(x) are the
solutions to:
V (x) = max
c;d;z
½
U(c;d) + °V (z)
¾
subject to: z =
1
1 + n
[R(x + w ¡ c) ¡ d] and z ¸ 0:
Let us further assume that the value function is concave and di®erentiable10.
For an interior solution (with positive bequests ~ z > 0), the two following optimality
conditions are obtained by di®erentiation:
U
0












Comparing these two conditions with the optimality conditions (9) and (10)
shows that the shadow price pt+1 is equal to the marginal value of bequests x?
t+1.
The optimality analysis with the Lagrangean Lt corresponds to a \marginal form" of
the Bellman equation applied to one particular solution. The Lagrangean method is
more powerful, because it requires no assumption on the (unknown) value function.
Moreover, providing an analytical form of the value function is feasible only in very
special cases. In the following example, we calculate a closed-form solution of the
value function in the case of log-linear life-cycle utilities.
Example
In the case of a log-linear utility U(ct;dt+1) = lnct + ¯ lndt+1 with ¯ > 0, we
prove that, under some conditions, there are positive constants a, b, m such that
V (xt) = a + bln(xt + m) is the unique solution of the Bellman equation. With this
form of the value function, equations (18) and (19) imply:
~ c =
(1 + n)(~ z + m)
°bR
and ~ d =
(1 + n)¯(~ z + m)
°b
10For the concavity and the di®erentiability of the value function, see Stokey and Lucas (1989)
and de la Croix and Michel (2002).
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~ M = (1 + ¯ + °b)ln(~ z + m) + °a ¡ (1 + ¯)lnb + »
where » = (1 + ¯)ln((1 + n)=°) ¡ lnR and ~ z is given by:
~ z + m =
°bR
(1 + n)(1 + ¯ + °b)




The condition ~ M = V (x) = a + bln(x + m) is then equivalent to the three
following conditions, which pin down m, b and a:
1) ln(x + m) = ln(x + w +
(1 + n)m
R
) implies m =
Rw
R ¡ (1 + n)
.











) ¡ (1 + ¯)lnb + »]
b is positive (° < 1), and m is positive11 if and only if R > 1 + n. In addition,
the condition for an interior solution (~ z(x) > 0 for all x > 0) is equivalent to
°R ¸ 1 + n. One can show that, under these assumptions, the value function
V (x) = a + bln(x + m) is the unique solution to the Bellman equation. When
°R = 1+n, the optimal bequest is always equal to the received bequest12, ~ z(x) = x.
When the degree of altruism ° is greater than (1 + n)=R, ~ z(x) is greater than x.
When it is smaller than (1 + n)=R, the optimal bequest is necessarily equal to zero
from a ¯nite date t onwards.
3 The intertemporal equilibrium
Until now we have focused on the behaviour of altruists, considering prices as given.
In this section, we examine the intertemporal equilibrium of the dynastic model, as-
suming that production occurs according to a neoclassical production function. Af-
ter characterising the competitive intertemporal equilibrium in the general case, we
11The function V is de¯ned for x ¸ 0 and the consumptions ~ c and ~ d are positive for ~ z ¸ 0 if and
only if m and b are positive.
12As we shall see in Section 3:2, where prices are endogenous, the steady-state equilibrium is
characterised by °R = 1 + n (the modi¯ed golden rule) when the bequest motive is operative.
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production function. We then consider the social optimum and its decentralisation.
We ¯nally spell out the main di®erences between the in¯nitely lived agent and the
dynastic model.
3.1 De¯nitions
3.1.1 Production and ¯rms
Production occurs according to a neoclassical technology F(K;L) using two inputs,
capital K and labour L. Homogeneity of degree one of the function F allows us to
write output per young as a function13 of capital per young: f(k) = F(k;1)+(1¡¹)k
where k = K=L is the capital stock per young (or worker) and ¹ 2 [0;1] the
depreciation rate of capital.
In each period, there is one representative ¯rm, producing one good, which is
either consumed or invested. For given prices, wage rate wt and interest factor Rt,
the maximum of pro¯ts, ¦t = F(Kt;Lt) ¡ wtLt ¡ RtKt, is obtained when marginal
products are equal to prices. The factor prices are given by:
wt = F
0
L(:) = f(kt) ¡ ktf
0(kt) ´ w(kt) and Rt = F
0
K(:) ¡ ¹ = f
0(kt) ´ R(kt) (20)
3.1.2 Intertemporal equilibrium
Given the initial capital stock K0 and the initial wealth of the ¯rst old altruists s¡1 =
K0=N¡1, an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence of prices
fwt;Rtgt¸0, of value functions fV ?
t gt¸0, of individual quantities fct;st;dt;xtgt¸0 and
of aggregate quantities fKt;Lt;Yt;Itgt¸0 such that in each period t:
² Firms maximise their pro¯ts (equation (20))
² Individuals maximise their utility ((16) for the ¯rst old and equation (7) for
the individuals born in period t ¸ 0)
² The next period's capital stock Kt+1 is equal to investment It or the sum of
individual savings Ntst:
Kt+1 = It = Ntst
13The function f is assumed continuous on IR+ and twice continuously di®erentiable on IR
?
+.
Moreover, we assume that for all positive k: f(k) > 0, f0(k) > 0 and f00(k) < 0.
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Lt = Nt and Yt = F(Kt;Nt) = Ntct + Nt¡1dt + It
In an economy with dynastic altruism, the assumption of perfect foresight is more
stringent than in models with sel¯sh individuals, such as the Diamond (1965) model,
where individuals only need to forecast next period's prices, namely the rate of in-
terest. As altruistic individuals have to forecast all future prices to take decisions
today, the characterisation of the economic equilibrium entails an in¯nite dimen-
sional ¯xed point of the sequence of prices fwt;Rtgt¸0. Sequences of value functions
fV ?




tgt¸0 are associated with the
sequence of prices, while the aggregation of individual optimal decisions determines
the macroeconomic variables and ultimately the sequence of prices.
3.1.3 Characterisation of the intertemporal equilibrium
Assuming that an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight exists, a simple
method of characterisation consists in replacing the equilibrium prices with their
expressions (wt = w(kt) and Rt = R(kt) = f0(kt)) in the individual optimality
conditions14. Under standard assumptions, equations (9) and (10), together with
Rt+1 = f0(kt+1), de¯ne the optimal consumptions as a function of the capital stock
and of the shadow price of bequests:
c
?
t = C(kt+1;pt+1) and d
?
t+1 = D(kt+1;pt+1)
We also have d?
0 as a function of p0 and the initial conditions (see equation (17)).
Plugging the optimal consumptions into the equation describing the evolution of
bequests and that driving the dynamics of capital, we obtain the two following
relations:



















14Since these optimality conditions are necessary and su±cient, the conditions obtained by sub-
stitution are also necessary and su±cient for an intertemporal equilibrium.
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(1 + n)kt+1 = E(kt;pt) + w(kt) ¡ C(kt+1;pt+1) (21)
When characterising the intertemporal equilibrium, we must distinguish two
cases depending on whether or not the optimal bequest in period t is positive.
Positive bequests (x?
t > 0)
If the optimal bequest x?







Equations (21) and (22) implicitly de¯ne a two-dimensional dynamics of kt and
pt. The initial capital stock k0 is given, but not the shadow price p0. These equations
de¯ne the forward-backward dynamics of the dynastic model. The same expressions
hold in each period, provided that bequests are positive all along the transition path.
In this case, the following transversality condition pins down the optimal path:
lim
t!+1°
tpt E(kt;pt) = 0 (23)
Zero bequests (x?
t = 0)
If the optimal bequest is equal to zero in period t, the dynamics in period t
can be described by a one-dimensional dynamic equation. If x?
t = 0, the equation
D(kt;pt) = (1+n)f0(kt)kt implicitly de¯nes pt as a function ¼ of kt, and we obtain:
(1 + n)kt = x
?
t¡1 + w(kt¡1) ¡ C(kt;¼(kt)) (24)
We can distinguish two cases depending on whether or not x?
t¡1 is positive. If
x?






t¡1 = E(kt¡1;¾(kt)), equation (24) implicitly de¯nes (for one period)
a one-dimensional dynamic equation.
If bequests are not positive in period t¡1 (x?
t¡1 = 0), equation (24) de¯nes (for
one period) a one-dimensional dynamic equation, which is similar to the dynamics
of the baseline overlapping generations model - the Diamond model of Section 2.1.
23
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 386
August 2004To check whether this occurs along the dynamic path of the altruistic economy, one






which holds when x?
t = 0.
In practice, it is only possible to characterise either intertemporal equilibria
along which bequests are always positive or equilibria along which bequests are
always zero. Analysing dynamics switching between a temporary equilibrium with
positive bequests and a temporary equilibrium with zero bequests is an issue for
future research.
3.2 The Cobb-Douglas case
We analyse the dynamics of the altruistic model in the Cobb-Douglas case. We look
for a solution satisfying (21) and (22) in all periods (i.e., a dynamic path along which
bequests are positive) and the transversality condition (23). With a Cobb-Douglas
production function f(kt) = Ak®
t (A > 0 and ® 2 (0;1)) we have:
wt = w(kt) = (1 ¡ ®)Ak
®




With a log-linear utility function U(ct;dt+1) = lnct+¯ lndt+1 (¯ > 0) we obtain,
according to (9) and (10), the following functions C(kt+1;pt+1) and D(kt+1;pt+1):
c
?





t+1 = D(kt+1;pt+1) =
(1 + n)¯
°pt+1









By multiplying equation (21) by pt we obtain:
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Let us de¯ne vt = Aptk®
t , the implicit value of output (for the dynasty). The








This equation admits a unique bounded solution, the constant solution:























Since pt = ¹ v=(Ak®
t ), we obtain:
x
?












Here again we must distinguish two cases depending on whether or not bequests
are positive. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the condition for positive bequests only
depends on parameters characterising preferences and technology.
Positive bequests (° > ¹ °)
When bequests are positive, the dynamics (kt;xt) of the economy can be fully
characterized analytically.
If ° > ¹ °, then for all t ¸ 0, we have:
8
> > > > <













These dynamics converge to the capital stock ^ k and the level of bequests ^ x:
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When ¹ ° is larger than 1 or individuals are not su±ciently altruistic to leave be-
quests (° · ¹ °), optimal bequests are zero, and we have D(kt;pt) = (1 + n)f0(kt)kt
and pt = ¼(kt) = ¯=(®°Ak®
t ). The intertemporal equilibrium with altruistic indi-
viduals is then equivalent to that of an economy consisting of sel¯sh individuals,
consuming entirely their life-cycle income. When individuals leave zero bequests,
the dynamics of the economy can also be expressed in an explicit manner.











The capital stock capital converges to kD:
k
D =
h (1 ¡ ®)A¯
(1 + n)(1 + ¯)
i 1
1¡®
To conclude this example, note that the possibility to switch from a temporary
equilibrium with positive bequests to a temporary equilibrium with zero bequests
along the transition path is excluded in the Cobb-Douglas economy.
3.3 Comparison with the planner's optimal solution
3.3.1 The central planner's problem
Consider a social planner with a utilitarian objective, that is a discounted sum
of generational utilities, with the discount factor re°ecting social time preference.
What should be the objective function of a central planner in an economy with al-
truistic individuals ? When individuals are altruistic, one faces the issue of whether
or not the social planner should ignore this dimension in designing the social objec-
tive. In other words, the question is whether or not the social planner should ignore
individuals' altruistic feelings, and simply adopt as social objective the discounted
sum of generational utilities, after laundering their altruistic components.
In studies on dynastic altruism15, the social objective usually only includes the
sel¯sh component of each generation's utility. If this were not the case, there would
15As noted by Michel and Pestieau (2001), the same approach can be adopted with other types
of altruism, in line with Harsanyi (1995) who wants to \exclude all external preferences, even
benevolent ones, from our social utility function". Using a model where bequests are motivated by
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ing to a time-inconsistent optimisation problem (see Bernheim, 1989). The most
usual speci¯cation assumes that the central planner mimics the founding father of
the dynasty, but without taking account of non-negative bequest constraints. It is
equivalent to the problem of a central planner combining life-cycle utilities. Hence,
the central planner problem can be interpreted in two ways. It can be considered ei-
ther as the command optimum of an economy with sel¯sh agents or as the command
optimum of an altruistic economy.
We consider the problem of a benevolent planner, who can allocate the resources
of the economy between capital accumulation, consumption of the young and con-
sumption of the old. The resource constraint F(Kt;Lt) = Ntct +Nt¡1dt +Kt+1 can
be expressed in intensive form f(kt) = (1+n)kt+1+ct+dt=(1+n). The objective of
the social planner is to maximise the discounted sum of the life-cycle utilities of all
current and future generations with the social discount factor ° under the resource








subject to: 8t ¸ 0 f(kt) = (1 + n)kt+1 + ct +
dt
1 + n
k0 and c¡1 given.





















t+1) = qt (26)
joy of giving, Michel and Pestieau (2001) compare the case where utilities are purged from their
altruistic component with the case where they are unaltered. Social discounting may also result
from uncertainty. See the discussion of social discounting in Arrow and Kurz (1970) and in Michel
(1990b).
16The two consumptions ct and dt+1 appear in two di®erent resource constraints (in t and t+1).
In order to apply the method of the Lagrangean Lt of period t, one can de¯ne a modi¯ed state
variable as in Michel and Venditti (1997).
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The transversality condition is:
lim
t!+1°
tqtkt+1 = 0 (29)
We can now compare these optimality conditions with those of the altruistic
problem ((9) to (12)), thereby analysing the decentralisation of the social optimum.
3.3.2 Decentralisation of the social optimum
The social optimum can be decentralised in a market economy with non-altruistic
individuals by means of lump-sum taxes and transfers. This is the Second Welfare
Theorem applied to the overlapping generations model - see Atkinson and Sandmo
(1980). The optimal transfer ¿t to each young individual in period t is ¯nanced by
a tax equal to (1 + n)¿t paid by each old at the same period. Since old individuals
consume the pro¯t net of taxes, the condition for decentralisation,
d
?
t = Rtst¡1 ¡ (1 + n)¿t = f
0(kt)(1 + n)kt ¡ (1 + n)¿t;






If all optimal taxes ¿t paid by the old are non-negative, the optimal path is
the intertemporal equilibrium of an economy with altruistic individuals; the level of
bequests is equal to the lump-sum tax x?
t = ¿t.
To prove this result, assume that for all t, x?
t = ¿t ¸ 0 and pt = qt. Hence,
the optimality conditions (9) to (11) are satis¯ed. Moreover, x?
t+1 = f0(kt+1)kt+1 ¡
d?
t+1=(1 + n) < f0(kt+1)kt+1. Since we have 0 · pt+1x?
t+1 < pt+1f0(kt+1)kt+1 =
(1+n)ptkt+1=° = (1+n)qtkt+1=°, the transversality condition (29) of the planner's
problem implies the transversality condition (12) of the altruist's maximisation prob-
lem. Hence, the solution of the planner problem is an intertemporal equilibrium of
an altruistic economy with positive bequests.
The intuition of this result is simple. When ¿t is always positive, altruistic agents,
who have the same utility as the social planner, choose to leave bequests equal to
the transfers implemented at the command optimum.
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intertemporal equilibrium of the dynastic model coincides with the planner's optimal
solution. Indeed, since the intertemporal equilibrium satis¯es x?
t > 0 in every period,





t=0 is the optimal allocation chosen by the planner with a
social discount factor °, the founding father of the dynasty behaves as a family
planner, reallocating the resources of the dynasty across generations. A dynasty
in which individuals are altruistic and are linked to future generations through
a chain of positive bequests can be interpreted as an in¯nitely lived individual.
Alternatively, the altruistic model can be thought of as a realistic interpretation of
the in¯nite horizon representative agent model.
3.3.3 In¯nitely lived agents versus altruistic agents
Even though the overlapping generations model with dynastic altruism can be
thought of as a microfoundation for the in¯nite horizon representative agent model,
four signi¯cant di®erences between these two models need to be stressed.
First, bequests must be positive. The old generation can never take resources
away from future generations; they could do so if inherited debt were enforceable.
Such a restriction does not make much sense in a model with in¯nitely lived agents.
In the absence of credit constraints, one can borrow against one's own future labour
income, thus shifting resources from the future to the present. It is not always
possible to interpret an in¯nitely lived agent as a dynasty of altruists.
Second, there is the condition that the indirect utility functions of each genera-
tion (the value functions) must be de¯ned, as each generation takes their life-cycle
decisions, being aware of the e®ects of their bequests on the welfare of the next
generation. In contrast, in¯nitely lived agent determine their entire consumption
path at the outset of their lives, taking prices as given.
Third, in contrast to the standard assumption of time-additively separable utility
functions in models of in¯nitely lived agent, we consider a more general formulation
of preferences, which are represented by a non-separable life-cycle utility function.
This has implications for the intertemporal substitution e®ects, which are reinforced,
when the current marginal utility depends on future consumption. As shown by
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the equilibrium dynamics.
The fourth di®erence relates to the transversality condition. In the altruistic
model, the discounted value of bequests tends to zero. In the in¯nitely lived agent
model, the discounted value of wealth tends to zero. The wealth of a representative
in¯nitely lived agent includes all the assets of the economy. On the contrary, the
bequest of an altruistic agent, who lives a ¯nite number of periods, only includes
the wealth transmitted to the next generation. Whereas the transversality condition
(29) of an in¯nitely lived agent implies the transversality condition of an altruist
(12), the converse is not true.
4 Steady state
In this section we con¯ne the analysis to steady states. There are two types of steady
states: steady state with positive bequests and steady state with zero bequests.
After spelling out the steady state equilibrium conditions, we specify the condition
under which bequests are positive and address the issue of existence and multiplicity
of steady states in the model of dynastic altruism.
In steady state, the marginal utility U0
d(c;d) can be eliminated in equation (13)
and the optimality condition (14) becomes °R · 1 + n (= if x > 0). The following
conditions are necessary and su±cient for a steady state equilibrium:






°R · 1 + n (= if x > 0) (32)
(1 + n)k = s (33)
w = w(k) and R = R(k) (34)
These conditions fully characterise the steady states of the dynastic model17.
The transversality condition is ful¯lled, since the degree of altruism ° is smaller
17These conditions imply the equilibrium condition of the good market, since we have: f(k) =






+ x and w(k) = c + s ¡ x = c + (1 + n)k ¡ x.
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equal to ^ R = (1+n)=°. The steady state capital intensity k is the so-called modi¯ed
golden rule, k = ^ k = f
0¡1((1 + n)=°).
4.1 Steady state with positive bequests
When bequests are positive, the intertemporal equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, since
it coincides with the social optimum (see Section 3:3). As the condition for non-
negative bequests plays an important role in the e®ectiveness of ¯scal policies, many
economists have investigated the determinants of bequests. In his seminal paper,
Barro (1974) mentioned the factors that are likely to in°uence bequests, and pointed
to the need for further analysis:
\The derivation under which the solution for intergenerational transfer
would be interior appears to be a di±cult problem and would seem to
require some specialization of the form of the utility functions in order
to make any headway. However it seems clear that bequests are more
likely to be positive the smaller the growth rate of the wage rate, the
higher the interest rate ..."
However, Barro considered an overlapping generations model with exogenous
wage and interest rate (see also Drazen, 1978), thereby disregarding signi¯cant gen-
eral equilibrium e®ects. Carmichael (1982) analysed a model of dynastic altruism
with a neoclassical production sector and emphasised the role of the underlying
utility function in the bequest behaviour. Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) were the
¯rst to establish a formal condition for the existence of a steady state with posi-
tive bequests. Both of them assume18 that the underlying overlapping generations
economy- the Diamond model - has a unique and stable positive steady state capital
intensity kD. The dynamics of the Diamond model are:
kt+1 = s
D(w(kt);R(kt+1))
where sD(:;:) is de¯ned Section 2.1.
Abel (1987) and Weil (1987) show that bequests are positive if and only if the
steady-state equilibrium of the Diamond model, kD, is smaller than the modi¯ed
18Weil (1987) assumes that the life-cycle utility function U(c;d) is additively separable.
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dition can be stated as follows: ° > (1 + n)=f0(kD), i.e. bequests are positive if the
bequest motive is su±ciently strong. This condition implies that over-accumulation
of capital in the Diamond model19 rules out positive bequests in the model of dy-
nastic altruism.
Although the Abel-Weil condition is intuitive, it is obtained under some re-
strictive assumptions on the Diamond model. Importantly, the characterisation of
equilibrium is based on the assumption of existence, uniqueness and stability of the
steady state of the Diamond model. Thibault (2000) has established a necessary
and su±cient condition for the existence of a steady-state equilibrium with positive
bequests, which holds regardless of the number and the stability property of steady
states in the Diamond model. This condition is obtained by expressing savings as a




= w(^ k) + (1 ¡
1 + n
^ R
)x = w(^ k) + (1 ¡ °)x ´ ­
The consumptions only depend on the disposable-for-consumption life-cycle in-
come ­, and satisfy the arbitrage condition (31), i.e. U0
c = ^ RU0
d. Thus, the ¯rst-
period consumption can be expressed as follows: c = ­ ¡ sD(­; ^ R). This leads to
an expression of savings as a function of bequests:
s = w(^ k) + x ¡ c = s
D(w(^ k) + (1 ¡ °)x; ^ R) + °x ´ Á(x)
An equilibrium with positive bequests exists if and only if Á(x) = (1+n)^ k admits
a positive solution ^ x. Assuming that the second-period consumption d is a normal
good, sD(w;R) is increasing with respect to w and, therefore, Á(x) is increasing.
The existence of a positive ^ x solution to Á(^ x) = (1 + n)^ k is then equivalent to
Á(0) < (1 + n)^ k, or:
s
D(w(^ k); ^ R) < (1 + n)^ k (35)
This condition means that, at the modi¯ed golden rule, savings in the underlying
overlapping generations economy would not be su±cient to maintain the capital
stock of the golden rule modi¯ed by the degree of altruism °. Given a level of
19Over-accumulation of capital occurs when kD is greater than the golden rule kG = f0¡1(1+n),
and thus also greater than the modi¯ed golden rule: kD > kG > ^ k.
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^ c = ^ x + w(^ k) ¡ (1 + n)^ k and ^ d = (1 + n)( ^ R^ k ¡ ^ x)
A graphical rule can be used to determine whether or not bequests are positive.
Altruists choose to leave positive bequests in the long run if and only if, evaluated
at the modi¯ed golden rule ^ k, the curve representing the saving function in the
Diamond model divided by 1 + n (i.e. k ! SD(k) = 1
1+nsD(w(k);R(k))) lies below
the 45± line.
To illustrate the graphical rule, let us consider four degrees of altruism °1, °2,
°3 and °4 arranged in ascending order. For each degree of altruism °i, we de¯ne
^ ki = f0¡1((1 + n)=°i), the capital stock of the golden rule modi¯ed by the degree of




^ k1 ^ k2 ^ k3 ^ k4 0
SD(k)
k
Figure 1: The graphical rule
The graphical rule indicates that the model of dynastic altruism does not experi-
ence a steady state with positive bequests if the degree of altruism is °1 or °3. Since
SD(^ k2) and SD(^ k4) are respectively smaller than ^ k2 and ^ k4, the dynastic model has
an equilibrium with positive bequests when the degree of altruism is either °2 or
°4. Interestingly, if the Diamond model has no positive steady state, the dynastic
model has a steady state with positive bequests, as the Diamond savings function
33
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 386





Figure 2: No positive steady state in the Diamond model
Furthermore, we remark that the necessary and su±cient condition (35) on sD
for the existence of a steady state with positive bequests can be equivalently ex-
pressed using the life-cycle utility function. This condition is equivalent to ° > (1+
n)U0
d(c;d)=U0
c(c;d); where the marginal utilities are evaluated at c = w(^ k)¡(1+n)^ k
and d = (1+n) ^ R^ k. As the function '(s) = U0
c(w(^ k)¡s; ^ Rs)¡ ^ RU0
d(w(^ k)¡s; ^ Rs) is
increasing in s because of the strict concavity of U, '((1 + n)SD(^ k)) = 0 and (35)
are equivalent to '((1 + n)^ k) > 0.
4.2 Steady state with zero bequests
Altruists who are not su±ciently wealthy to leave a bequest to their children behave
as if they were sel¯sh. Any steady state with zero bequests of the economy with
dynastic altruism, therefore, is a steady state of the Diamond economy. The zero-
bequest steady states of the model of dynastic altruism feature a capital stock which
is greater than that of the modi¯ed golden rule, since equations (32) and (34) imply
that a steady state with zero bequests satis¯es the following inequality: °f 0(k) ·
1+n, or equivalently k ¸ ^ k. Since the modi¯ed golden rule capital stock ^ k is smaller
than that of the golden rule kG = f0¡1(1 + n), regardless of the degree of altruism,
dynamically-ine±cient equilibria of the Diamond model are equilibria with zero
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which are also equilibria of the dynastic model, are located between the modi¯ed
golden rule capital stock ^ k and the golden rule capital stock kG. According to the
graphical rule, the zero-bequest equilibria of the dynastic model are the Diamond
equilibria located on the right-hand side of the modi¯ed golden rule, ^ k. Whereas the
steady state with positive bequests is unique, there can be a multiplicity of steady
states with zero bequests.
4.3 Existence and multiplicity of steady states
The steady state with positive bequests can coexist with bequest-constrained equi-
libria, which are formally equivalent to those of the Diamond model20. To illustrate











Figure 3: Multiplicity of equilibria
The economy depicted in Figure 3 experiences three steady states. The equilib-
rium with positive bequests ^ k coexists with two bequest-constrained equilibria kD
2
and kD
3 . The steady-state equilibrium kD
1 , which would be a steady state of the
Diamond model, is not an equilibrium of the dynastic model, as it is smaller than
the modi¯ed golden rule (kD
1 < ^ k). In contrast to the Diamond model, the model of
20Aiyagari (1992) obtains a similar result in a pure exchange economy.
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We consider two cases. First, if the Diamond model has no positive steady state,
we have proved in Section 4:1 (see Figure 2) that the dynastic model has a unique
steady state, the modi¯ed golden rule ^ k. Second, if the Diamond model has several
positive steady states, either the highest of these equilibria, kD
max; is greater than,
or equal to, ^ k and it is a steady state with zero bequests, or kD
max is smaller than ^ k
and the dynastic model has a steady state with positive bequests, because (35) is
satis¯ed21.
Finally, using the graphical rule, it is straightforward to establish that the dy-
nastic model has a unique positive steady state only in two cases:
- If the Diamond model has no positive steady state greater than ^ k, the dynastic
model has a unique steady state, the modi¯ed golden rule.
- If the Diamond model has a unique steady state kD greater than ^ k and if (35)
is not satis¯ed , kD is the unique equilibrium of the dynastic model.
5 Fiscal policies
Any dynamic path of the economy with dynastic altruists coincides with the social
optimum, provided that bequests are positive all along the equilibrium path (see
Section 3:3). This means that ¯scal policies aimed at redistributing resources be-
tween generations have no impact on the intertemporal equilibrium, as long as ¯scal
policy choices remain compatible with the existence of an equilibrium with positive
bequests. Public debt is neutral, as public intergenerational transfers resulting from
the issuance and redemption of government bonds are o®set by private intergenera-
tional transfers of an equivalent amount. In this section, we illustrate the neutrality
of ¯scal policies by analysing their e®ects on the steady state of the dynastic model.
First, we present the debt-neutrality result. Second, we extend the neutrality result
to unfunded or pay-as-you-go social security schemes. Third, we analyse the e®ects
of estate taxation on the equilibrium of the dynastic model. Finally, we reconsider
public debt and its neutrality property, when bequest motive is inoperative before,





= 0 (since SD(k) <
w(k)
1 + n
). Thus, for k > kD
max we have SD(k) < k.
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We consider a public debt scheme along the lines of Diamond (1965). The rela-
tion between savings and capital accumulation is modi¯ed, as savings ¯nance both
physical capital and government bonds:
Kt+1 + Bt = Ntst
In each period the government reimburses the capital and interest of the outstanding
debt by issuing new bonds and levying taxes on the young. The government budget
constraint is:
Bt = RtBt¡1 ¡ Nt¿t
Bt denotes the total level of debt and ¿t is a lump-sum tax paid by each young.
We further assume that the debt issued in period 0 was distributed to the old
in period 0 and that there is no public spending. We de¯ne the debt per young
individual bt ´ Bt=Nt¡1 and assume that it is constant, bt = b. The path of taxes
necessary to maintain this constant debt ratio is given by: ¿t = (Rt ¡ (1 + n))b.
Henceforth, we restrict the analysis to steady state with a view to explaining the
debt neutrality result in a simple framework. In steady state, we have:
¿ = [R ¡ (1 + n)]b
In the absence of government intervention (b = 0), fc,d,x,kg is a steady state
of the dynastic model if and only if the optimality conditions (30), (31), (32), (33)
and (34) are satis¯ed (see section 4). When bequests are positive (x > 0), equation
(32) pins down the steady state capital stock, the modi¯ed golden rule k = ^ k, and
the long-run equilibrium is fb c,b d,b x,b kg. To extend the baseline model to public debt,
only two optimality conditions have to be modi¯ed in steady state.
² The ¯rst-period budget constraint becomes:
w + x ¡ ¿ = c + s where ¿ = [R ¡ (1 + n)]b
² The relation between the capital stock and savings reads now:
s = (1 + n)(k + b)
Given k = ^ k and x = ^ x+ ^ Rb; the consumptions are c = ^ x+w(^ k)¡(1+n)^ k = ^ c
and d = ^ Rs ¡ (1 + n)x = ^ d. The condition for positive bequests x > 0 results
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modi¯ed in the long run with a constant debt per young individual. The Ricardian
equivalence theorem applies to the model of dynastic altruism, when the bequest
motive is operative before debt is issued. The only changes concern the decision
variables s and x. Altruists counter the government intervention by reallocating
their bequests and their savings. Increasing their bequests by b Rb allows them to
leave their consumption path and their utility una®ected, when the government
issues public bonds amounting to b.
5.2 Neutrality of pay-as-you-go social security
An increase in social security bene¯ts makes parents richer and children poorer,
since children pay taxes to ¯nance the social security system. Altruistic parents,
who leave bequests to their children before the increase in the scale of the social
security programme, are aware of the transfer of resources operated by the pension
system and react to this policy change by increasing their bequests. Any increase in
the scale of the social security programme is thereby o®set by an equivalent increase
in bequests, provided that bequests are positive before the policy change.
To simplify the exposition, we consider the steady state of an economy without
a pay-as-you-go social security system (¿ = 0), which we denote with f^ c, ^ d,^ x,^ kg. In
steady state, the optimal bequest ^ x satis¯es equation (31):
U
0
c(w(^ k) + ^ x ¡ ^ s; ^ R^ s ¡ (1 + n)^ x) = ^ RU
0
d(w(^ k) + ^ x ¡ (1 + n)^ s; ^ R^ s ¡ (1 + n)^ x)
where ^ s = (1 + n)^ k is the level of savings at the modi¯ed golden rule.
Let us consider an unfunded pension scheme consisting of a payroll tax ¿ paid by
the workers and a pension bene¯t µ given to the retirees. The budget of the public
pension system is balanced in each period:
µ = (1 + n)¿
If bequests are positive, the steady state capital stock is given by the modi¯ed
golden rule. The incomes of the young and the old are x+w¡¿ and Rs+(1+n)¿,
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U
0
c(x + w ¡ ¿ ¡ s;Rs + (1 + n)¿ ¡ (1 + n)x)
= RU
0
d(x + w ¡ ¿ ¡ s;Rs ¡ (1 + n)x + (1 + n)¿) (36)
When k = ^ k, w = w(^ k), R = ^ R and s = ^ s, x = ^ x + ¿ is the solution to
equation (36). Given a level of bequests x = ^ x + ¿, the consumption of parents,
d = ^ R^ s + (1 + n)¿ ¡ (1 + n)x = ^ R^ s ¡ (1 + n)x = ^ d, as well as the consumption of
children, c = w(^ k) ¡ ¿ + x ¡ ^ s = w(^ k) + ^ x ¡ ^ s = ^ c, are not a®ected by the pension
system.
The neutrality of a pay-as-you-go system is valid in the dynastic model, pro-
vided that bequests are positive before its introduction. The private intergenera-
tional transfers from parents to children exactly o®set the public intergenerational
transfers operated by the pension system, and the optimality conditions de¯ning
the consumption path of the dynasty remain unchanged. Altruistic agents increase
their bequests exactly by the amount of taxes paid by the young to ¯nance the social
security scheme.
5.3 Estate taxation
Estate taxation a®ects the intertemporal equilibrium, since it distorts individual
choices. A proportional tax rate ¿e applies to bequests, and the tax revenue is
redistributed in a lump-sum manner, µe, to the young individuals. Thus, the ¯rst-
period budget constraints are modi¯ed as follows:
(1 ¡ ¿e)x + w + µe = c + s




· 0 (= if x > 0)
If bequests are positive, the steady-state capital stock ^ ke is given by:
^ ke = f
0¡1
³ 1 + n
(1 ¡ ¿e)°
´
Assuming that the government budget is balanced in each period, we have: µe =
¿ex. Estate taxation reduces the capital stock (^ ke < ^ k), while increasing the interest
factor (i.e. R(^ ke) > R(^ k)). As the net product per young agent (available for
consumption) f(^ ke) ¡ (1 + n)^ ke is diminished, estate taxation reduces the steady
state welfare of altruistic individuals.
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The neutrality of government debt or public pension hinges on the assumption that
bequests are positive all along the equilibrium path. If bequests are constrained
before government intervention, the Ricardian equivalence theorem does not hold,
and ¯scal policy a®ects the economic equilibrium. Let us reconsider the case of public
debt. The steady-state equilibrium with a constant debt ratio, b, is characterised
by the following equations:
x
b + w


















b · 1 + n (= if x
b > 0)
(1 + n)(k








b ¡ (1 + n)]b
There are two possibilities depending on whether xb is positive or equal to zero.
² If xb = 0, the steady state fcb;db;xb = 0;kbg is a steady state of the Diamond
economy.
² If xb is positive, the steady state is given by the modi¯ed golden rule, with
kb = ^ k, Rb = ^ R, wb = w(^ k) and sb = (1 + n)(^ k + b).
The optimal solution f^ c; ^ d;^ kg corresponds to the steady state obtained by ignor-




^ R^ s ¡ ^ d
1 + n
the transfer (positive or negative) which is desired by the parents. Taking into ac-
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To examine the e®ects of public debt, we distinguish di®erent cases depending
on the level of debt and the degree of altruism °. When the desired parent-to-child
transfer is non-negative (~ x0 ¸ 0), a positive debt implies ~ xb > 0 and we obtain the
neutrality result showed in Section 5:1. When the desired intergenerational transfer
is negative (~ x0 < 0) in the absence of public debt, altruists choose to leave no
bequests (i.e. x0 = 0). Altruists then behave as pure life-cyclers and ¯scal policy -
public debt or social security - is e®ective.
When ¯scal policy is e®ective, its e®ects depend on the size of public debt, b.
Consider the threshold level of debt ¹ b equal to ¡°~ x0=(1+n). When the size of debt
b is su±ciently low (b · ¹ b), public debt does not a®ect bequests. As bequests are
constrained before and after the government intervention, the e®ect of public debt
is the same as in the Diamond model.
However, when b is greater than ¹ b, bequests xb become positive. Bequest motive
is inoperative before the introduction of debt but not afterwards. Importantly, an
increase in b from above ¹ b has no further e®ect on the equilibrium. This property has
been studied by several authors in voting models (see, e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer,
1989). In this framework, the amount of debt preferred by old agents is the level ¹ b;
which makes individuals free from the non-negative bequest constraint.
6 Heterogenous altruistic dynasties
Up to now we have assumed that the economy consists of a perfectly homogenous
population. Such an assumption does not allow to study the distributional e®ects
of ¯scal policy, as all individuals are identical within each generation. Departing
from this assumption leads us to reconsider the e®ects of ¯scal policy, especially the
neutrality result.
We consider an economy consisting of two types of altruistic agents. They have
the same life-cycle utility function U(c;d), but di®erent degrees of altruism: °1 > °2.
In each dynasty, all agents have the same degree of intergenerational altruism °i,
i 2 f1;2g. We denote with pi the exogenous proportion of individuals of type i.
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of ¯scal policy.
6.1 Steady state
In steady state, the optimality conditions (30), (31) and (32) apply to the two types
of individuals with xi, ci, si, di and °i. The equilibrium prices satisfy (34), but the
relation between the capital stock and savings needs to be amended to take account
of individuals' heterogeneity:
(1 + n)k = p1s1 + p2s2 (37)
As we have °2 < °1, the optimality conditions imply °2R < °1R · 1 + n. Since
condition (32) holds for both types, a positive bequest in the less altruistic dynasty
(x2 > 0) is ruled out. Only individuals belonging to the dynasty endowed with
the higher degree of altruism can leave bequests. In steady state, the less altruistic
individuals leave no bequests (x2 = 0) and their saving function is similar to that of
sel¯sh individuals: s2 = sD(w(k);R(k)).
If bequests are positive in the more altruistic dynasty (x1 > 0), according to (32)
we have: °1R(k) = 1+n. The steady-state capital-labour ratio is that of the modi¯ed
golden rule corresponding to the degree of altruism of the more altruistic agents
(k = ^ k1 = f0¡1((1 + n)=°1)). The steady state capital-labour ratio is determined
by the degree of altruism of the more altruistic agents, regardless of their relative
number. The society is divided into two classes: those who are linked with their
children through bequests and those who behave as if they were sel¯sh.
The fact that the steady-state capital-labour ratio ^ k1 is not a®ected by the share
of the more altruistic individuals in the population is consistent with the ¯ndings of
Ramsey (1928) and Becker (1980), who show that, in an economy with heterogenous
in¯nitely lived agents, the most patient ones impose their view on the long-run
capital accumulation23.
Let us calculate the savings of the more altruistic individuals, s1, in the case of
positive bequests x1 > 0. In steady state, the life-cycle budget constraint of the
23Vidal (1996a) extends this result to heterogeneous dynasties of a closed economy. Vidal (2000)




Working Paper Series No. 386




= w(^ k1) + (1 ¡
1 + n
R(^ k1)
)x1 = w(^ k1) + (1 ¡ °1)x1 ´ ­1
In addition to their wages, altruists consume the di®erence between the bequest they
receive from their parents and the bequest they leave to their children. This, along
with the condition U0
c(c1;d1) = R(^ k1)U0
d(c1;d1); implies: c1 = ­1 ¡ sD(­1;R(^ k1)).
Their consumptions only depend on their disposable-for-consumption life-cycle in-
come. By substitution in the ¯rst-period budget constraint, we obtain:
s1 = w(^ k1) + x1 ¡ c1 = s
D(w(^ k1) + (1 ¡ °1)x1;R(^ k1)) + °1x1 ´ Á1(x1)
Under the assumption that the second-period consumption is a normal good,
sD(w;R) is increasing in w, and thus Á1(x1) is increasing in x1. Moreover, Á1
increases from Á1(0) = sD(w(^ k1);R(^ k1)) to +1, when x1 increases from 0 to +1.
The equilibrium condition (37) is at the steady state ^ k1:
p1Á1(x1) = (1 + n)^ k1 ¡ p2s
D(w(^ k1);R(^ k1))
and there exists a solution x1 > 0 if and only if the right-hand-side of this expression
is greater than p1Á1(0):
(1 + n)^ k1 > s
D(w(^ k1);R(^ k1))
This is exactly the condition we would have in the model of homogenous altruistic
agents with degree of altruism °1. At the modi¯ed golden rule ^ k1, the Diamond
saving function lies below the modi¯ed golden rule capital stock. In this case,
there exists a unique steady state with positive bequests x1 in the economy with
heterogenous altruists. The bequests of the more altruistic individuals compensate
for the insu±cient savings of the less altruistic individuals. This clearly appears
when studying the e®ect of p1 on the equilibrium. Even though the capital-labour
ratio ^ k1 of the modi¯ed golden rule does not depend on the share of more altruistic
individuals in the population, the level of bequests does. Interestingly, x1 is a
decreasing function of p1, and so is the life-cycle income ­1. The lower the proportion
of the more altruistic agents, the more they consume and the higher their utility.
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We consider the case of a government debt b that is constant per young individual.
The ¯rst-period budget constraint of individuals of type i needs to be amended to
take account of taxation:
w + xi ¡ ¿ = ci + si
Physical capital and government bonds are ¯nanced by savings of both types of
individuals:
(1 + n)(k + b) = p1s1 + p2s2 (38)
The analysis developed in Section 6:1 still applies. We have x2 = 0, s2 =
sD(w ¡ ¿;R) and if x1 > 0: k = ^ k1, ­b
1 = w(^ k1) ¡ ¿ + (1 ¡ °1)x1 and:
¿ = (R(^ k1) ¡ (1 + n))b ´ "(^ k1)b
The savings of the more altruistic individuals are:
s1 = Á1(x1;b) ´ °1x1 + s
D(w(^ k1) ¡ "(^ k1)b + (1 ¡ °1)x1;R(^ k1))
Equation (38) becomes:
p1Á1(x1;b) = (1 + n)( ^ k1 + b) ¡ p2s
D(w(^ k1) ¡ "(^ k1)b;R(^ k1))
Bequests x1 are positively related to government debt b. When x1 is positive,
public debt is neutral from the aggregate point of view, since it does not modify cap-
ital, output and total consumption. In the economy with heterogenous agents, it has
redistributive implications, reducing the income, the consumptions and the welfare
of the less altruistic individuals. Since total consumption is unchanged, increasing
public debt results in higher levels of consumption and welfare for the more altruis-
tic individuals. This stems from the increase in the bequests of the more altruistic
individuals x1, compensating for the lower savings of the less altruistic individuals.
Public debt has no redistributive implications only in the case of homogenous agents
(p1 = 1), provided that bequests are positive.
6.3 Pay-as-you-go social security and estate taxation
A pay-as-you-go system with lump-sum taxes and bene¯ts entails the same e®ects
as government debt. When bequests are positive in the more altruistic dynasty
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The life cycle income ­¿
2 of the less altruistic individuals is reduced by an increase
in the scale of the social security programme. With a lump-sum tax ¿ paid by
the young, the bene¯ts received by retirees are µ = (1 + n)¿; and the steady-state
life-cycle income of the less altruistic individuals is given by:
­
¿
2 = w(^ k1) ¡ ¿ +
µ
R(^ k1)
= w(^ k1) ¡ (1 ¡ °1)¿ < w(^ k1) = ­2
Aggregate variables and prices are unchanged in the long run, whereas there
is a welfare loss for the less altruistic individuals and a welfare gain for the more
altruistic individuals.
Estate taxation with heterogeneous individuals has been studied by Michel and
Pestieau (1998)24. A proportional tax rate ¿e applies to bequests and the tax revenue
is redistributed in a lump-sum manner µe to the young individuals. Thus, the ¯rst-
period budget constraints are modi¯ed as follows:
(1 ¡ ¿e)xi + w + µe = ci + si




· 0 (= if xi > 0)
This implies that the less altruistic individuals do not leave bequest (x2 = 0),
and if x1 is positive, the steady-state capital stock ^ ke is given by:
^ ke = f
0¡1
³ 1 + n
(1 ¡ ¿e)°1
´
Assuming that the government budget is balanced in each period, we have: µe =
¿ep1x1. Estate taxation reduces the capital stock (i.e. ^ ke < ^ k1), while increasing the
interest factor (i.e. R(^ ke) > R(^ k1)). The net product per young agent (available for
consumption) f(^ ke) ¡ (1 + n)^ ke is diminished.
Estate taxation has three e®ects on the welfare of the less altruistic individuals
who do not leave bequests: a negative e®ect on their labour income w(^ ke), a positive
e®ect resulting from the redistribution of estate tax revenues µe = p1¿ex1 and a
24They consider the case in which the less altruistic individuals are pure life-cyclers (i.e., °2 = 0).
The value of °2 (< °1) has no impact on the steady-state equilibrium; see Vidal (1996a).
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consumption. For the more altruistic individuals, there are two additional e®ects,
the tax on bequests and the induced changes in bequests. Michel and Pestieau
(1998) show in a simple case with a log-linear utility and a Cobb-Douglas production
function that the negative e®ect dominates for a su±ciently low level of the estate
tax rate ¿e, and that estate taxation worsens the steady-state welfare of both types
of agents.
7 Other forms of altruism
The neutrality of ¯scal policy hinges on individual reactions. The motive for in-
tergenerational transfers is therefore crucial in analysing the e®ects of ¯scal policy.
Dynastic altruism guarantees the neutrality of ¯scal policy when bequests are pos-
itive, but results are less clear cut, when other motives underpin intergenerational
transfers. In this section we present several models of intergenerational altruism
and analyse ¯scal policy in each of them, thereby making clear the conditions for
the neutrality of ¯scal policy.
We distinguish two strands of models. In the ¯rst one, the utility of the bene¯-
ciary is an argument of the utility of the benefactor. Since we have already examined
the model of descending dynastic altruism, we focus on others forms of pure altru-
ism: ascending and two-sided altruism. In the second one, altruism is said to be
ad hoc. Either the altruistic argument in the benefactor's utility function is only
some part of the utility of the bene¯ciary (Burbidge 1983, Abel 1987) or some other
variables such as the level of bequests (paternalistic altruism) or the level of income
(family altruism).
7.1 Others forms of pure altruism
7.1.1 Ascending altruism
In his 1974 paper, Barro stresses that the neutrality result depends on the existence
of positive transfers between parents and children. These transfers can be from
parents to children (descending) or from children to parents (ascending). The model
of ascending intergenerational altruism is formally similar to the model of descending
altruism. Children have an altruistic concern for their parents and face the following
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ct + st + gt = wt
dt+1 = Rt+1st + (1 + n)gt+1
where gt denotes the gift that individuals born in period t give to their parents and
(1+n)gt+1 the gifts that they receive in period t+1 from their 1+n children. Gifts
are private intergenerational transfers from the young to the old and are restricted
to be non-negative in each period:
gt ¸ 0
We again consider a recursive de¯nition of altruism. Children care about their
parents' welfare by weighting their parents' utility in their own utility function vt.
Denoting with vt¡1 the well-being of their parents, we assume that the utility of
individuals born in period t is given by:
vt = U(ct;dt+1) + ±vt¡1
where ± 2 (0;1) is the degree of ascending altruism. This formulation is based
on several implicit assumptions. We can substitute parental utilities backwards to
obtain an in¯nite sequence of past life-cycle utilities (from t = 0 to t = ¡1).
The optimality conditions are therefore similar to those prevailing in the case of
descending altruism ((13) and (14)). Equation (13) is the arbitrage condition driving
consumption choices, whereas reversing the direction of transfers leads to replacing
(13) with the following condition:
¡U
0
c(ct;dt+1) + ±(1 + n)U
0
d(ct¡1;dt) · 0 (= if gt > 0) (39)
Since ascending altruism is based on calculations regarding past utilities, this
formulation raises some modelling concerns:
² Past variables are given and cannot be modi¯ed. In this context, what is the
signi¯cance of a backward dynamics of the capital stock?
² Assuming that all generations have the same behaviour, the intertemporal
equilibrium goes from t = ¡1 to t = +1 and has no initial condition.
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Along the same lines as those we developed when analysing descending altruism,
one can show that public debt or pay-as-you-go social security do not a®ect steady-
state consumptions, when long-run gifts are positive. Individuals can counter ¯scal
policies by adjusting gifts. Ricardian equivalence holds, as long as the chain of
positive intergenerational transfers is not broken. Since public debt is an ascending
public transfer between generations, an increase in the level of public debt is o®set
by an equivalent decrease in gifts. There therefore exists a level of public debt, such
that gifts are driven down to zero. When public debt is su±ciently high, parents
become so wealthy that there is no longer a need for gifts. As gifts are no longer
positive, families cannot counter ¯scal policies, which are then e®ective.
7.1.2 Two-sided altruism
Neither descending nor ascending altruism can guarantee the neutrality property,
which holds only if bequests or gifts are positive. Some authors have therefore
combined both ascending and descending altruism, leading to a new form of altruism
known as two-sided or reciprocal altruism.
Since intergenerational transfers operate in both directions, from children to
parents (gifts gt) and from parents to children (bequests xt), an individual born in
t faces the following budget constraints:
ct + st + gt = wt + xt
dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 = Rt+1st + (1 + n)gt+1
In each period, private intergenerational transfers are assumed to be non-negative:
gt ¸ 0 and xt ¸ 0 (40)
Assuming that individuals have an altruistic concern for both their parents and
their children, one can represent their utility function as follows:
vt = ±vt¡1 + U(ct;dt+1) + °vt+1
25O'Connell and Zeldes (1993) analyse the model of ascending altruism under the assumption of
strategic behaviours. When parents save less to receive more, the steady state may be characterised
by under-accumulation of capital.
² From (13), (20) and (39), the steady state capital stock of the economy with
positive gifts satis¯es: f0(k) = R = (1 + n)±. The steady state with positive gifts is
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of descending altruism, respectively.
The formulation of two-sided altruism deserves some comments:
² Analysing two-sided altruism is di±cult, because the life cycle utility U(ct;dt+1)
is both in vt¡1 and in vt+1, and two key questions therefore arise. When does a
solution exist ? What is the relation between the degree of ascending altruism and
the degree of descending altruism ? Kimball (1987) shows that strong assumptions
on the degrees of altruism are required to guarantee that an in¯nite sum of life-cycle
utilities is the solution to the functional equation de¯ning the utility of altruists26.
Some parametric restrictions are also necessary to ensure that intergenerational
transfers are positive.
² Since the intertemporal equilibrium goes from ¡1 to +1, there are no initial
conditions.
² In a model where individuals leave bequests to their children and support their
parents, three types of steady-state equilibrium are possible. Because of the two
inequality constraints (40), there are two ¯rst-order conditions (14) and (39), which
are not mutually compatible in steady state. The steady state cannot therefore
be characterised by both positive bequests and positive gifts. Either bequests are
positive and gifts zero, or bequests are zero and gifts positive, or both are zero.
There is a wide range of parameters leading to inoperative intergenerational transfers
motive (see Vidal, 1996b).
Concerning ¯scal policies, the results are straightforward extensions of those
obtained under one-sided altruism. The neutrality of government debt is again
guaranteed only if the same type of transfers (either gifts or bequests) is positive
both before and after the change in the level of government debt.
7.2 Ad hoc altruism
There always are restrictions to the neutrality of public debt in models of dynastic
altruism. In the literature there is only one speci¯cation of altruism ensuring that
Ricardian equivalence always holds. This speci¯cation departs from the recursive
26Kimball (1987) shows that the sum of both degrees of altruism must be smaller than one, i.e.
± + ° < 1.
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utility function, which we review in this section. First, we examine the speci¯cation
of the altruistic utility function ensuring debt neutrality and highlight its caveats.
Second, we present paternalistic altruism, whereby bequests are broadly equivalent
to consumption goods in the utility of parents. Third, we brie°y expound family
altruism, which departs from paternalism, but still does not assume that families
are in¯nitely lived decision makers.
7.2.1 A model with debt neutrality
Burbidge (1983) has proposed a particular form of altruism, which always results in
debt neutrality. He suggests adding a term of ascending altruism, which relates to









This utility function is the sum of the utility of dynastic altruists born in t (see
expression (5)) and the life-cycle utility of their parents, which is weighted by an
altruistic factor 1=°. Given ct¡1, this implies that the welfare function of the young






The intertemporal equilibrium of this model coincides with the command optimum.
Transfers to the young are interpreted as bequests and transfers to the old as gifts.
Fiscal policies, therefore, are ine®ective. Importantly, note that the component of
descending altruism appears in the central planner's objective, but not the compo-
nent of ascending altruism of future generations.
Abel (1987) has extended Burbidge's analysis by assuming that the altruistic
concern for parents is weighted by ±, which can di®er from 1=°. For ± 6= 1=°, ¯scal
policy is not always neutral, because the objective of an altruist, vt = ±U(ct¡1;dt)+
P+1
j=1 °jU(ct+j;dt+1+j), di®ers27 from that of the social planner.
27In contrast to the model of two-sided dynastic altruism, it is su±cient to assume that the
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ism. Both Burbidge and Abel make a distinction between the concern for parents
and the concern for children, as if future generations had no concern for their par-
ents.
7.2.2 Paternalistic altruism
We examine one of the most popular speci¯cation of ad hoc altruism. Bequests
are said to be paternalistic, when parents derive utility not from their children's
utilities, but from the size of the estate they leave to them. The utility function of a
paternalistic altruist, who is born in t and consume ct and dt+1, can be represented
by the following function:
vt = U(ct;dt+1) + ©(xt+1) (41)
where xt+1 is the level of bequests and separability is assumed for the sake of sim-
plicity. © is de¯ned on the set of non-negative values of xt+1 and the non-negative
bequest constraint still applies to this model. With an in¯nite marginal utility of
zero bequests (i.e., limx!0 ©0(x) = +1), optimal bequests are always positive. As
the objective function (41) does not depend on the decisions and budget constraints
of children, ¯scal policies are e®ective.
Paternalistic bequests are related to altruistic bequests. Paternalistic parents
also accumulate savings for the purposes of leaving bequests to their children. Nev-
ertheless the amount and structure of bequests are not related to their children's
preferences, but rather to parental views on what is good for their children, or to
the pleasure they derive from giving. Models dealing with paternalistic bequests are
therefore often referred to as \bequest-as-consumption models" or \joy-of-giving
models", because bequests enter in the parental utility function as a consumption
good (see, for example, Abel and Warshawsky (1988) or Andreoni (1989)).
7.2.3 Family altruism
Models of dynastic altruism consider the family as an in¯nitely lived entity. By
contrast, models of pure life-cyclers feature another extreme view on the family,
according to which parents and children are fully distinct economic units. Follow-
ing Becker (1991), one can envisage a less drastic approach to modelling economic
relations within the family.
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isolated household. Each individual starts a new household, when he becomes adult.
In turn, each of an individual's children will also establish a new household, and so
on. Individuals are members of two family units: the family founded by their parents
and their own household. They play a di®erent role in these two households. They
belong to the former during both their childhood and adulthood, where they play
the role of children, and to the latter when adult and old, where they play the role
of parents. In the former they make no decision, being completely passive when
young and being only a descendant and possibly heir when adult. In the latter they
are fully °edged decision makers.
Family altruism refers to the sentiments between these two successive households.
Altruists born in t take account of their children's adult disposable income denoted
with !t+1. The budget constraints of individuals born in t are the following:
!t = wt + xt = ct + st
Rt+1st = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1
!t+1 = xt+1 + wt+1
xt+1 ¸ 0
The utility of altruists depends on three arguments: their ¯rst-period consumption
ct, their second-period consumption dt+1 and their children's disposable income !t+1
during adulthood:
vt = U(ct;dt+1) + ª(!t+1)
Altruists can in°uence the starting position of their grown-up children. They are
non-paternalistic, since intergenerational transfers aim at providing children with a
good starting position in life. The idea28 behind family altruism is that parents care
only about the income of their children and not about how they use their income.
The concept of family altruism leads to interesting ¯scal policy conclusions. It
can be shown that the introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system has no real
28Some growth models with human capital use a similar concept of altruism. For example, the
preference of altruists in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) depends on the quality of schools. This
variable is directly linked to the adult disposable income of children (see Section 8).
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such a neutrality property does not hold for public debt.
To illustrate the neutrality of a pay-as-you-go pension system, we assume that
the government levies a tax ¿t+1 on each young and distributes the tax revenue to
the old, born in t, who receive µt+1. Balancing the pension system in every period
implies Ntµt+1 = Nt+1¿t+1, or µt+1 = (1+n)¿t+1. Following the method developed in
Section 5:2, the new optimal bequest is x0
t+1 = xt+1+¿t+1.The parental consumption
and the income of children are not altered by the social security scheme, as we have:
d
0
t+1 = Rt+1st + (1 + n)¿t+1 ¡ (1 + n)x
0
t+1 = Rt+1st ¡ (1 + n)xt+1 = dt+1
!
0
t+1 = wt+1 ¡ ¿t+1 + x
0
t+1 = wt+1 + xt+1 = !t+1
This proves that bequests exactly o®set the intergenerational transfers operated by
the pension system.
The non-neutrality of public debt is straightforward. Assume that a debt, issued
in period t+1, is distributed to the old in t+1 and is reimbursed by the young in t+3.
Since altruists born in t do not take into account the utility of their descendants,
they do not care about the situation of agents born in t + 3. As in the Diamond
model, but in contrast to models of dynastic altruism, public debt has real e®ects.
The model with family altruism29 leads to conclusions regarding the e®ectiveness
of ¯scal policy, which are less clear-cut and more realistic than those obtained with
either the standard overlapping generations model or the model of dynastic altruism.
8 Extensions
Intergenerational altruism signi¯cantly in°uences the economic equilibrium and the
e®ectiveness of ¯scal policy. It is worth enquiring, as it most likely underpins a wide
range of economic decisions. Sel¯shness is certainly not a fully satisfactory assump-
tion for the analysis of bequests, gifts, or private education. Altruistic behaviours
29Lambrecht, Michel and Thibault (2002) analyse the equilibrium dynamics of the model with
family altruism and show that its dynamical properties are halfway between the overlapping gen-
erations model with pure life-cyclers (Diamond, 1965) and the model of dynastic altruism (Barro,
1974). For an analysis of pay-as-you-go social security in a model of family altruism, see Lambrecht,
Michel and Vidal (2004).
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as environmental policies. In this section, we consider two issues that can be anal-
ysed under the assumption of altruistic behaviours. First, we consider a model of
education, where parents' educational choices are driven by altruism. Second, we
turn to environmental economics and present a model, where there is an intergen-
erational external e®ect.
8.1 Altruism and education
In growth models, education is closely related to the concept of human capital,
which represents a quantity of e±ciency units of labour. The production function,
F, uses two inputs, physical capital Kt and e±cient labour or human capital Ht.
This function is assumed to be linearly homogenous and each production factor is
paid its marginal product:
Rt = F
0
K (Kt;Ht) = f
0 (kt) where f (k) = F (k;1) and kt = Kt=Ht
wt = F
0
L (Kt;Ht) = f (kt) ¡ ktf
0 (kt) = w(kt)
The labour income of an individual that supplies ht e±ciency units of labour is
equal to wtht. The human capital of individuals born in t depends on their parents'
human capital, ht, and their parents' educational spending, et:
ht+1 = '(ht;et)
Altruistic parents, who maximise Vt = u(ct;dt+1)+Vt+1, choose how much to spend
on their children's education, along with their consumptions, ct and dt+1, and the
bequest they leave to their children, xt+1. We can then write the altruistic maximi-
sation problem as follows:
V
¤
t (xt;ht) = max
ct;et;dt+1;xt+1
U (ct;dt+1) + V
¤
t+1 (xt+1;ht+1)
subject to : xt + wtht = ct + (1 + n)et + st
Rt+1st = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1
ht+1 = '(ht;et)
Parents take into account the impact of their educational spending on the welfare
of their children, which depends on their level of human capital, ht+1, and their
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the baseline model of dynastic altruism. Most authors have assumed that there is
no physical capital or that parents have an altruistic concern only for the level of
human capital of their children.
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) have for example developed a simpli¯ed altruistic
model of education, in which parents are only concerned for their children's human
capital, focusing on the distribution of income in the economy. Parents decide on the
education of their children. In each period t, children devote ut units of their time
endowment to educate themselves, whereas their parents pay et for their education.
They also bene¯t from the level of human capital of their parents, ht, so that their







t with ® > 0 and 0 < ¯ < 1 (42)
An individual's income in period t + 1 is ht+1. With their income individuals
¯nance their consumption and the education of their children:
ht+1 = ct+1 + et+1 (43)
The life-cycle utility is assumed to be log-linear:
Ut = ln(1 ¡ ut) + lnct+1 + lnet+1 (44)
Individuals choose ut, ct+1 and et+1 so as to maximise (44) subject to the constraints

































If human capital is initially distributed according to a log-normal distribution of
mean ¹0 and variance ¾2
0, human capital in period t is distributed according to a
log-normal distribution of mean ¹t and variance ¾2
t:
¹t+1 = b
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When education is publicly ¯nanced, all individuals bene¯t from the same level
of educational spending, et, which is ¯nanced by a wage tax, ¿t:
et = ¿tht
The utility of an individual born in t is then the maximum of (44) under the
constraints:
ct+1 = (1 ¡ ¿t+1)ht+1 and et+1 = ¿t+1ht+1
Individuals make less e®ort to educate themselves under a public education
system. Given ¿t+1 and ¹ ht+1, they maximise ln(1 ¡ ut) + lnht+1 under the con-









t. The optimal e®ort is smaller than under a private education
regime, because individuals can no longer directly in°uence the education level of
their children.
The public educational spending and therefore the level of taxation are the result
of a voting equilibrium. The derivative of an individual's utility with respect to ¿t+1
is equal to 1
1¡¿t+1 + 1
¿t+1 and the maximum level of utility is obtained for ¿t+1 = 1=2.
The result of the voting equilibrium is given by:
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We can conclude from this model that:
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¢2 = 0), whereas a
private education system maintain inequality (¾2
t = ¾2
0).
² In the long run, the mean of the logarithm of human capital grows at a lower
rate under a public education regime (¹P
t+1¡¹P
t ' bP) than under a private education
regime (¹¤
t+1 ¡ ¹¤
t = b¤ > bP). The same conclusion applies to the average level of




t = bP ¡ 1










In the model of Glomm and Ravikumar, the e®ect of taxation on growth is
negative, because taxation reduces educational e®orts. In another formulation of
this model, the educational e®ort is made by parents, who devote time lt to the
education of their children. Individuals then face the following budget constraints:
wt (1 ¡ lt) = ct + et








In this model, taxation and public education exert opposite e®ects, because time
devoted to the education of children is free from taxation. The growth rate is then
higher under a public education regime (see Wigniolle, 1994).
8.2 Altruism and the environment
Dynamic issues relating to the environment, pollution or the depletion of natural
resources, have mainly been analysed in the framework of optimal growth models.
The main feature of environmental externalities is their double dimension, intra-
and intertemporal, as they a®ect today's generation as well as future generations.
Altruistic individuals are concerned for the quality of the environment over their
life-cycle, as they directly su®er from pollution or poor environmental quality, but
also for the quality of the environment in the future, as they are altruistically linked
to their children. Along with physical capital (here bequests), the environment is
an asset which is passed on to future generations. Altruistic individuals therefore
devote resources to abate pollution and to preserve the quality of the environment.
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ations. Private contributions to ¯nance public goods typically result in underprovi-
sion, as subscription equilibria are non-cooperative. There is a case for public inter-
vention in spite of the altruistic tendencies of private individuals (see Howarth and
Norgaard 1995), as subsidies to private contributions can restore e±ciency. If pollu-
tion stems from industrial activities, there is a tradeo® between the accumulation of
physical capital and the quality of the environment. The private return of physical
capital di®ers from its social return, thereby leading to a second ine±ciency. In
contrast to results obtained in the baseline altruistic model, the market equilibrium
is no longer Pareto-optimal, when taking account of environmental externalities.
Jouvet, Michel and Vidal (2000) examine these aspects in a model consisting
of altruistic individuals, who only consume during their second period of life, but
whose utility is negatively a®ected by the level of pollution. They can voluntarily
contribute to environmental quality. There is no population growth. The utility of
individuals born in period t can be written as follows:
Vt = U (dt+1;Pt+1) + °Vt+1
subject to : xt + wt = st
Rt+1st = dt+1 + zt+1 + xt+1
xt+1 ¸ 0 and zt+1 ¸ 0
where the main di®erence with respect to the maximisation problem set up in Section
2 is the voluntary contribution to pollution abatement zt+1 and the pollution term in
the utility function. The emission of pollutants in period t is a linear function of the
output level, aYt+1, and pollution abatement occurs according to a linear technology,
¡bZt+1 (where Zt+1 is the total contribution to environmental cleaning), whereas
pollution absorption takes place linearly, (1 ¡ h)Pt. The dynamics of pollution are
therefore given by:
Pt+1 = (1 ¡ h)Pt + aYt+1 ¡ bZt+1
When choosing their personal contribution zt+1, individuals take other individ-
uals' contributions as given. We have:
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the technology of pollution abatement is e±cient30, b > a.
In steady state, four types of equilibria are possible, depending on whether or
not bequests are positive and on whether or not voluntary contributions to pollution
abatement are positive. To illustrate these equilibria, we consider the following




, where P is an upper limit on the
level of pollution and ¸ the relative weight of environmental quality, P ¡ P, in the
















Figure 4: Steady state equilibria
When individuals are not su±ciently altruistic (low °), bequest motive is inop-
erative and we have: kt+1 = wt = f (kt) ¡ ktf0 (kt). If the steady state ~ k is unique,
the condition for positive bequest is:





If bequests are positive, the steady state is the modi¯ed golden rule k° =
f0¡1 (1=°). In the absence of voluntary contributions, the steady-state level of pollu-
tion is e P (°) = aNf (k°)=h. There is a threshold31, e ¸(°), on the weight of pollution
in the utility function above which contributions are positive. Alternatively, when
30Each unit produced devoted to pollution abatement has a negative net e®ect, a ¡ b, on the
increase of pollution.
31The expression of this threshold is derived in Jouvet, Michel and Vidal (2000).
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in the utility ¸ exceeds a threshold e ¸0 (°). In both cases, the thresholds triggering
positive contributions are lower, the higher the degree of intergenerational altruism.
The competitive equilibrium is suboptimal, because of the two externalities pre-
vailing in the economy. The ¯rst externality is well-known in public economics;
the Cournot-Nash decision process is ine±cient, and individuals under-contribute
to pollution abatement. The second externality a®ects the economy through the
production process: altruistic individuals do not take into account the e®ect of
production on pollution, thereby leading to a level of capital that is higher than
socially desirable. The central planner takes into account these two externalities





subject to : f (kt) = dt + zt + kt+1
Pt = (1 ¡ h)Pt¡1 + aNf (kt) ¡ bNzt
k0 and P¡1 given








° (1 ¡ a=b)
This is the genuine modi¯ed golden rule that takes into account the environmen-
tal externality of capital accumulation. The social planner chooses to accumulate
less capital than altruistic individuals, f0 ¡
kS¢
> 1=°. This is because the social
value of capital di®ers from its private value, as altruistic individuals fail to inter-
nalise the impact of production on the environment. Furthermore, the social planner
takes into account the social willingness to pay for pollution abatement, leading to
higher spending on pollution abatement than in the competitive equilibrium.
Since two externalities have to be internalised by altruistic individuals, the de-
centralisation of the social optimum can be achieved by using two policy instru-
ments. First, to attain an e±cient allocation of resources between consumption, a
private good, and the quality of the environment, a public good, the government
has to subsidise contributions to pollution abatement. Second, the government has
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istic individuals do not take into account the adverse consequences of pollution on
environmental quality. This can be done by setting a tax on the return of savings.
9 Conclusion
Altruism is the appropriate microeconomic foundation underpinning the possible
ine®ectiveness of ¯scal policy in stimulating economic activity, referred to as Ricar-
dian equivalence. Our review of altruistic growth models shows that the Ricardian
equivalence theorem does not always hold in dynastic models. The debt neutrality
result hinges on positive private transfers between successive generations (bequests
or gifts). When these transfers are zero, ¯scal policy is e®ective. Barro's intuitive
formulation of altruism in macroeconomic models does not always deliver Ricardian
equivalence, when taking account of all general equilibrium linkages. Even extending
his intuition to two-sided altruism is not enough to ensure debt neutrality without
conditions, as ¯scal policy is e®ective when both bequests and gifts are zero.
Dynastic altruism features the view of highly rational economic agents, who
are farsighted and see through the government budget constraint, thereby possibly
countering the e®ects of ¯scal policies. A speci¯c ad hoc form of altruism is needed to
deliver the debt neutrality results without conditions. The altruistic utility proposed
by Burbidge (1983) is formally equivalent to a central planner's objective and, not
surprisingly, delivers Ricardian equivalence, but as any ad hoc formulation it su®ers
from weak theoretical foundations. The model of dynastic altruism remains the
benchmark for discussing debt neutrality, as it o®ers a fully consistent framework
to analyse ¯scal policy in an intertemporal framework.
As argued by Ricardo, the neutrality result is a point of theory, insofar as
individuals certainly su®er from myopia, leaving some room for ¯scal policy. Ex-
tending the basic framework to heterogeneous individuals provides some insights in
this respect. The steady state equilibrium is still a modi¯ed golden rule, which de-
pends on the degree of altruism of the more altruistic individuals, but ¯scal policy
entails important redistributive e®ects between heterogeneous dynasties. Models
consisting of both short-sighted or sel¯sh individuals and far-sighted or altruistic
individuals certainly represents a better abstraction of real world economies, and
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August 2004further progress in the characterisation of the e®ects of ¯scal policy on economic
activity requires a better understanding of individual heterogeneity in macroeco-
nomic models. Analysing transition dynamics of heterogeneous economies is key to
understanding both the long term and the short term e®ects of ¯scal policy.
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